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Abstract: This article was written in response to a re-
quest from an editor of American Vedantist. It is shown
that the idea that consciousness is essential to under-
standing quantum mechanics arises from logical fallacies.
This may be welcome news to those who share the au-
thor’s annoyance at consciousness being dragged into dis-
cussions of physics, but beware: The same fallacies may
underlie the reader’s own way of making sense of quan-
tum mechanics. The article ends up embracing a Vedan-
tic world view, for two reasons. For one, such a world
view seems to the author to be the most sensible al-
ternative to a materialistic one. For another, quantum
mechanics is inconsistent with a materialistic world view
but makes perfect sense within a Vedantic framework of
thought.
Ever since its formulation three quarters of a century ago,
quantum mechanics (QM) stands accused of applying
a double standard to measurements: While as physical
processes measurements are governed by the Schro¨dinger
equation, as constituents of a “classical domain” they
exist in an anterior logical relationship to QM and are
governed instead by the so-called projection postulate.
Some physicists have taken this to mean that QM is in-
consistent. Others have felt that QM is incomplete: It
does not tell us when a physical system evolves in a deter-
ministic fashion as dictated by the Schro¨dinger equation,
and when it changes unpredictably in conformity with
the projection postulate.
Those who have come closer to understanding the real
import of QM have realized that QM spells the end of
mathematical realism: The mathematical symbols em-
ployed by QM cannot be interpreted as mirroring (rep-
resenting, describing) the physical world. The mathe-
matical formalism of QM provides us with probability
measures; it serves to assign probabilities to the possible
outcomes of possible measurements. That’s all there is
to it. The rest is metaphysics. This is OK since physics
without metaphysics would not be physics—it would be
pure mathematics, without any connection to the physi-
cal world. The problem is to find the right metaphysics,
which at the very least ought to be free from logical fal-
lacies.
Since the mathematical symbol known as the “state
vector” or the “wave function” is nothing but a proba-
bility measure, the so-called “measurement problem” is
spurious. No unpredictable transition from one physi-
cal state of affairs to another occurs, so none needs to
be explained. What changes unpredictably is a probabil-
ity measure, and this for reasons that are obvious rather
than mysterious. Probabilities are assigned to possible
events on the basis of relevant facts. They depend (i) on
the time t of the events to which they are assigned and
(ii) on the facts on which they are based. They can there-
fore change in two ways: in a deterministic manner as
functions of t, and unpredictably with every new relevant
fact. The successful completion of a measurement is the
relevant fact par excellence. If the outcome of the mea-
surement is unpredictable, as it generally is, it has to be
included among the relevant facts on which probability
assignments must subsequently be based. The outcome
being unpredictable, the basis of relevant facts changes
unpredictably as a matter of course, and so do the prob-
abilities that we assign on this basis. No mystery there.
Unfortunately it is never hard to invent new pseudo-
problems. Let p (R, t) stand for the probability of finding
an alpha particle inside a region R at a time t. While few
would think of this probability as something that exists
inside the region R, many succumb to the temptation
of thinking of it as something that exists at the time t.
The idea is that the possibility of finding the alpha in-
side R exists at all times, so the probability associated
with this possibility also exists at all times and changes
as a function of time.[1] Yet the possibility that some-
thing happens at the time t is not something that exists
at the time t, anymore than the possibility of finding the
alpha in R is something that one can find inside R. And
the same holds true of the probabilities associated with
these possibilities. Probabilities are not things that sub-
sist and change; the time on which quantum-mechanical
probabilities depend is the time of the measurement to
the possible results of which they are assigned. To think
of possibilities or probabilities as if they possessed an
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actuality of their own, different from the actuality of
facts, is to commit a category mistake. Some physicists
commit it rather bluntly; they call their reified possibili-
ties “propensities”[2] or “potentialities”[3, 4] and believe
what happens during a measurement is that one of these
acquires the status of a fact while the others lose their
semi-actuality and cease to exist. Others commit it im-
plicitly as when they hope or attempt to “understand
how it is that probabilities become facts”.[5]
This too is a pseudo-problem. Saying in common lan-
guage that a possibility becomes a fact is the same as
saying that something that is possible—something that
can be a fact—actually is a fact. How can that be a
problem? This non-problem becomes a pseudo-problem
if one forgets that there is only one kind of actuality and
misconstrues the common-language “existence” of a pos-
sibility as a second kind of actuality. It seems hard to be-
lieve that there are physicists—and quite a few—who still
try to explain the transition from this pseudo-actuality
to bona fide actuality, but there you are.
Another name for this pseudo-problem is the “emer-
gence of classicality”. QM is a tool for assigning proba-
bilities to possibilities. It assigns probabilities on the ba-
sis of facts, and it assigns them on the assumption that
exactly one possibility (no matter which) becomes a fact,
in the innocuous common-language sense of “becoming a
fact”. Since QM presupposes facts from beginning to end
(from the “preparation” of a physical system to a mea-
surement on the system), it cannot possibly account for
the existence of facts. So what accounts for the existence
of facts—the emergence of “classicality”?
Counter-question: What could account for the exis-
tence of facts? The existence of facts is not something
that can be accounted for, any more than we can give an
answer to the question of why there is anything at all,
rather than nothing. As integral Vedantists we may hold
that Brahman or Maya (the creative power of Brahman)
accounts for the existence of facts, but then we stand be-
fore the mystery of the existence of Brahman, and there
we are left dumbfounded. The fallacy that the existence
of facts can and ought to be explained, arises when one
thinks of the possibilities to which QM refers, and of the
probabilities it assigns to them, as if they constituted a
self-existent matrix from which facts arise. A silly cate-
gory mistake, but there you are.
To recap, by mistaking the wave function—a prob-
ability measure—for an actual state of affairs one cre-
ates one pseudo-problem (How is it that this actual state
of affairs changes unpredictably during a measurement?)
and by mistaking possibilities for actualities one creates
another pseudo-problem (How is it that certain possi-
bilities acquire the extra actuality that turns them into
facts?). Since the early days of QM consciousness has
been invoked as a filler for either or both of these al-
leged explanatory gaps [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13], for two
reasons. The first is that quantum physicists habitually
speak of “observations” when they mean measurements
and of “observables” when they mean measurable quan-
tities. This has created the impression, and promptly
called forth the claim, that consciousness is essential to
understanding QM.
The second reason is that QM concerns probability
assignments, and in the deterministic world of classi-
cal physics probabilities are always subjective: We re-
sort to probability assignments as and when we are ig-
norant of the precise initial conditions that determine
the subsequent behavior of a physical system. Quantum-
mechanical probabilities, however, come in two varieties:
subjective and objective: The latter variety has nothing
to do with ignorance; there is nothing for us to be igno-
rant of. The probability associated with a particular re-
sult of a measurement is subjective if it is assigned on the
basis of an incomplete set of relevant facts, such as when
the measurement is actually made but we are as yet igno-
rant of its result. Probabilities associated with the pos-
sible results of unperformed measurements are objective
just in case all relevant facts are taken into account.[14]
There is, accordingly, a need to distinguish between
performed measurements and their actual results on the
one hand, and unperformed measurements and their pos-
sible results on the other. But this has nothing to do with
the fact that the results of performed measurements are
usually known to someone. The difference between per-
formed and unperformed measurements is not that the
results of the latter are not known or perceived. The dif-
ference is that unperformed measurements are not per-
formed!
The bottom line, so far, is that there isn’t any prob-
lem that could be solved by dragging consciousness into
discussions of QM. The questions that consciousness is
supposed to answer are pseudo-questions.
What about the converse? If consciousness does not
help us understand QM, maybe QM can help us under-
stand consciousness? (The underlying idea here is what
philosopher David Chalmers has called the “law of min-
imization of mystery”: “consciousness is mysterious and
quantum mechanics is mysterious, so maybe the two mys-
teries have a common source”[15]). The mystery of con-
sciousness is essentially the question of how it relates to
the material world—how anything material can be con-
scious, and how anything can be conscious of the material
world. What seems obvious to me is that as long as no-
one has any clear idea about what QM is trying to tell
us about the material world, it would be premature, if
not outright foolish, to turn to QM for answers to these
profound and fascinating questions.
Beginning with Fritjof Capra’s popularization of the
idea that physicists and Eastern mystics have some-
thing common to talk about, these questions—as well
as the equally profound and fascinating problem of mak-
ing sense of QM—have been obfuscated by concoctions of
mysticism and QM dished out by numerous woolly mas-
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ters. Among these The Self-Aware Universe by Goswami
et al.[16] presents a worst-case scenario, not least be-
cause of the truths it contains—and makes a mockery of
by buttressing them with absurdities, fallacies, and non
sequiturs.[17] “To hitch a religious philosophy to contem-
porary science” may not be, as Bernstein maintains, “a
sure route to obsolescence”.[18] But to hitch it to a trav-
esty of QM certainly is.
I am not opposed to the notion that physicists and
mystics have something common to talk about. Yet they
cannot do so profitably unless they cease to be muddle-
headed about their respective domains. It seems to me
that in the end physics will of its own accord converge
with a spiritual philosophy that strictly holds its ground
if both remain faithful to their principles. The words of
the German poet Schiller are pertinent here: “Enmity be
between you! Too soon it is for alliance. / Search along
separate paths, for that is how truth comes to light.”
“That which thinks not by the mind [or, that which
one thinks not with the mind], that by which the mind
is thought, know that to be the Brahman and not this
which men follow after here,” the Kena Upanishad [19]
admonishes us. There is a consciousness beyond mind,
and Goswami is absolutely right when he asserts that
consciousness transcends both matter and mind. But
to refer to this transcendent consciousness as “quan-
tum mind” is ludicrous (as ludicrous as Zohar and Mar-
shall’s “quantum self”[20, 21] and Chopra’s “quantum
healing”[22, 23]), and so is his supporting tale: Percep-
tion consists of the collapse of a possibility wave in the
presence of awareness. The subject consciousness of the
experience arises with the chosen brain state both of
which exist only as possibility until the collapse. The
observer forces the many possibilities into a single, mani-
fested actuality by the very act of observation. The brain
is a measuring instrument which collapses the infinite
and eternal quantum mind into concreteness as mani-
fested through individual experience. The universe exists
as formless potentia in myriad possible branches in the
transcendent domain. And so on ad nauseam. As one
reviewer remarked, “he sounds like Madame Blavatsky
with a hangover”.[24]
Now that we have disposed of the pseudo-problems and
of some of their gratuitous answers (answers that do not
involve consciousness have also been given), we are ready
to address a real problem. How can a particle go through
two slits without going through a particular slit and with-
out being divided into parts that go through different
slits? For this is what happens in a two-slit experiment
whenever nothing indicates the slit taken by a particle.
This problem arises from a mismatch between space and
the way we tend to think about space. Ask yourself how
you think about the empty regions L and R inside the
two slits. No doubt you will consider them different, sep-
arate, distinct. This is why the behavior of particles in
two-slit experiments baﬄes us. If a particle goes through
both slits without going through a particular slit then
the distinctness of L and R implies that the particle has
two parts, one that goes through L and another that goes
through R. Since, in fact, the particle does not get di-
vided by its passage through the slits, L and R cannot
be distinct. That’s what baﬄes us.
But think again. How are L and R different? You
may say, well, they are in different places. So where are
these different places? If you contemplate this question
long enough, you will realize that you are poised either
for a tautology or for an infinite regress. Either: L is
where L is. Or: L is inside another region L′, which is
inside another region L′′, and so on ad infinitum. The
root of the problem is that we keep switching between
two inconsistent modes of thinking. If we ask about the
position of L, we treat L as a thing to which a position—a
property—can be attributed. If we answer that L is in L,
we treat L both as an object with a position and as the
position of an object. If we reply that L is in L′, we treat
L′ as a property of L. If we then ask about the position
of L′, we switch back to thinking of L′ as a thing to which
properties can be attributed.
The problem has an easy solution: Stop thinking about
regions of space as if they were things. The regions L
and R are properties that may or may not be possessed.
L (that is, the property of being inside L) is possessed
just in case there is a thing T inside L. Saying (A) “T is
inside L” seems to be different from saying (B) “T has
the property L” because proposition (A) seems to imply
that L is a thing that contains T . But, in fact, L is not a
thing, and (A) says exactly what (B) is saying. Much the
same applies to (numerically exact) positions: We tend
to think of them as points, and we tend to think of these
points as things to which positions can be attributed. In
reality they do not have positions, they are positions, and
positions are not things but properties that may or may
not be possessed by things. As such they do not exist (in
the material world) unless there are material objects to
which they can be attributed.
Back to our particle. At the time it went through the
slits it wasn’t inside L, it wasn’t inside R, and it didn’t
consist of two parts, one inside L and one inside R. As
long as you assume that space is a thing that has parts—
and once you start thinking that way you end up thinking
that any finite region of space has infinitely many distinct
parts,—you just can’t make sense of this. But it is wrong
to conceive of space as a thing that has parts because it
is logically inconsistent to think of properties as if they
were things. The behavior of particles in two-slit exper-
iments forces us to acknowledge a fallacy we have been
committing with impunity because the world of classical
physics was consistent with it.
So space is not a thing that has parts but a set of posi-
tions. If we take into account that all positions are rela-
tive positions,[25] we arrive at the conclusion that space is
the totality of relative positions that exist between mate-
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rial objects. (Another word for “relative position” is spa-
tial relation.) QM further takes into account that a po-
sition measurement can never distinguish between more
than a finite number of finite regions, so that only finite
regions are available as attributes. Attributable positions
are always finite regions such as L and R. If a particle
goes through both slits, neither L nor R is attributable
to it, nor does it have parts to which the regions L and R
are separately attributable. What is attributable to the
particle is the region L+R that is “made up of” L and R.
Made up of L and R? Doesn’t this imply that L and
R are distinct parts of L+R? It does not, for L+R is a
property rather than a thing that has parts. It is possi-
ble that L+R is attributable to a particle while neither
L nor R is attributable to anything. In this case the dis-
tinction we make between “The particle went through L”
and “The particle went through R” is a distinction that
Nature does not make; it corresponds to nothing in the
material world; it exists solely in our heads.
Thus our spontaneous, untaught way of thinking about
space—as a thing that has parts—is wrong. And so is
the way in which students of physics, to this very day,
are being taught to think about space, namely as a man-
ifold of intrinsically distinct point individuals. It involves
the same fallacy, namely to think of conceptually distinct
properties as if they were intrinsically distinct things.
And if these students stumble over the behavior of parti-
cles in two-slit experiments, they are warned not to waste
their time wondering. “Do not keep saying to yourself, if
you can possibly avoid it, ’But how can it be like that?’
because you will go ’down the drain’ into a blind alley
from which nobody has yet escaped. Nobody knows how
it can be like that.”[26] Nobody knows because every-
body has been taught the wrong way of thinking about
space.
This sorry state of affairs warrants an inquiry into its
neurophysiological and psychological roots. You proba-
bly know that a certain area of the retina (known as the
blind spot) lacks light-sensitive cells. You don’t see an ob-
ject if its optical image falls on this area. If the object is a
black cross on white paper, you only see a white area, and
if the paper is red, you see a red area instead. No visual
information reaches your brain from this area, yet some-
times it looks white and sometimes it looks red. Here is
why: The brain analyses the data it receives from both
eyes by detecting contrasts. It “sees” the edges of more or
less homogeneously colored and evenly lit regions, where
all but the most gradual variations in brightness and/or
color occur. These regions themselves are not (directly)
seen but are filled in on the basis of changes in brightness
and color occurring across their boundaries. The region
containing the blind spot is uniformly filled in just like
any other contrast-free region.
The way in which the brain processes visual informa-
tion guarantees that the result—the phenomenal world—
is a world of objects that are bounded by surfaces.
The phenomenal world—the world as we perceive it—
therefore conforms to the “cookie cutter paradigm”[27,
28] (CCP) according to which the world’s synchronic mul-
tiplicity rests on surfaces that carve up space in the man-
ner of three-dimensional cookie cutters. The parts of any
material object—including the world as a whole—are de-
fined by the parts of the space it “occupies”, and the
parts of space are defined by delimiting and separating
surfaces. This seems self-evident because this is how we
perceive the world because this is how the brain analyses
visual information.
We are prone to think that the mind works as it does
because the brain works as it does, but in any spiritual
conception of the world it must be the other way round.
To understand why the brain works as it does we need to
know why the mind works as it does.
There is, we said, a consciousness beyond mind. For
the most detailed account of this consciousness and its
relation to both matter and mind—as well as the most
solidly founded on experience—we turn to Sri Aurobindo.
In the Aurobindonian scheme of things, the world is an
evolving manifestation of Brahman. Mind (manas) is the
highest creative principle hitherto evolved but not by any
means the highest. The original creative principle and
dynamic link between Brahman and the world is super-
mind (vijnana). The creative action of the supermind
is primarily qualitative and infinite and only secondarily
quantitative and finite. Mind is the agent of this sec-
ondary action—limiting, defining, dividing, individualiz-
ing. Here is how Sri Aurobindo describes the character-
istic action of mind, or mental consciousness:
Mind in its essence is a consciousness which
measures, limits, cuts out forms of things from
the indivisible whole and contains them as if
each were a separate integer. Even with what
exists only as obvious parts and fractions, mind
establishes this fiction of its ordinary commerce
that they are things with which it can deal sepa-
rately and not merely as aspects of a whole. . . It
is this essential characteristic of Mind which
conditions the workings of all its operative pow-
ers, whether conception, perception, sensation
or the dealings of creative thought. It conceives,
perceives, senses things as if rigidly cut out from
a background or a mass and employs them as
fixed units. . . [29]
This characteristic action of mental consciousness is the
real reason why the phenomenal world conforms to the
CCP, and why we find it so hard not to think of space
itself as a thing that has parts. As long as we take the
parts of matter to be defined by the parts of space, the
parts of space are logically prior to the parts of matter;
hence they exist independently of matter; hence space is
a thing that has parts. Moreover, since it is in the nature
of mind to deal with parts as if they were things that ex-
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ist by themselves, rather than by virtue of some process
of division or differentiation, space would be infinitely di-
vided if it did conform to the mental outlook. The idea
that all (conceivable) parts of space exist by themselves
inevitably leads to the contemporary physicist’s concep-
tion of space as a manifold of intrinsically distinct point
individuals.
The characteristic action of mental consciousness is
also the reason why we are by nature materialists, for
the essence of materialism is the idea that multiplicity is
fundamental. Mind deals with parts, in both perception
and conception, “as if each were a separate integer”. The
essential function of the concept of “matter” is to betoken
the separate existence of each part.
It will be illuminating to contrast two misconceptions
arising from the mind’s way of dealing with the world
with what QM has to say—if we allow it to say what it
has to say and do not force it into a conceptual framework
that renders it incomprehensible. The first is that if there
are ultimate parts—that is, if things are ultimately made
of partless parts—then these have the form of a point. If
the physical world were created along the lines laid down
by the CCP, the shapes of things would be bounding
surfaces, and matter would be an extended stuff bounded
by surfaces. A material object would have as many parts
as the space it occupies, and an object without parts—a
particle like the electron—would be a bit of stuff with the
form of a point.
The second misconception is that things are re-
identifiable. Let me illustrate this with another exper-
iment, a two-particle collision. Initially we have two in-
coming particles, one heading northward and one head-
ing southward, and after the collision we have, per as-
sumption, two outgoing particles, one heading eastward
and one heading westward. Here re-identifiability means
that each outgoing particle is identifiable with one of the
incoming particles: The outgoing particle heading east-
ward is identical with either the incoming particle head-
ing southward or the incoming particle heading north-
ward. This is implied by the separate matter tokens that
the mind places into things in order to account for their
separate existences.
Now let’s hear what QM has to say. QM, recall, forces
us to conceive of space in the only logically consistent
way, as the totality of spatial relations existing between
material objects. Let’s distinguish between the external
spatial relations of an object and its internal spatial re-
lations. (The external spatial relations of an object O
are those between O and objects that have no parts in
common with O. The internal spatial relations of O are
those between O’s own constituent parts.) The position
of O, properly conceived, is any of O’s external spatial
relations. The form of O, properly conceived, consists
of the spatial relations between its parts. By this def-
inition, an object that lacks parts, and therefore lacks
internal spatial relations, also lacks a form.
To convince yourself that the ultimate constituents of
matter are formless rather than pointlike, try to imag-
ine a single pointlike object. As you imagine a pointlike
object, you also imagine a spatial expanse in which this
object is situated. You cannot imagine a point without
imagining a space that surrounds or contains it. A point
is a form, and the existence of a form implies the exis-
tence of space. But you are asked to imagine a single
pointlike object—not any other thing, nor any of this
object’s relations to other things. So you must not imag-
ine its external spatial relations. And since a pointlike
object lacks parts and therefore lacks internal spatial re-
lations, your mental picture must not contain any spatial
relations. But space is a set of spatial relations, so your
mental picture must not contain space. And since the
existence of a form implies the existence of space, your
mental picture must not contain any form. The upshot
is that the existence of a pointlike form is inconsistent
with the proper way of thinking about space—as a set of
spatial relations.
If you find it hard to conceive of electrons as formless
objects, join the club. But keep in mind that no-one has
ever seen an electron. By looking at the traces it has left
one can see where it has been but one cannot see its form.
Experiments can only establish the absence of evidence
of internal spatial relations, which by itself is consistent
with either a pointlike form or no form at all. So on the
principle of theoretical parsimony alone (Occam’s razor)
we should consider it pointless to attribute to an electron
the form of a point.
And what does QM have to say about our collision
experiment? It tells us in unmistakable terms that if
the particles are of the same type and their spins (if
they have) are not antiparallel, then the outgoing parti-
cle heading eastward is neither the same as nor different
from either of the incoming particles. In this case the
distinction between “E is identical with N” and “E is
identical with S” (where E stands for the outgoing par-
ticle heading eastward and N and S stand for the incom-
ing particles) is another distinction that Nature does not
make; it corresponds to nothing in the material world; it
exists solely in our heads. In other words, the particles
are not re-identifiable.
Now recall that re-identifiability is implied by the sep-
arate matter tokens that the mind places into things in
order to account for their separate existences. What QM
tells us here is that there are no separate matter tokens.
Consequently, if we consider particles of the same type,
and if we consider them in themselves, out of relation
to each other, we must consider them identical not just
in the weak sense of exact similarity but in the strong
sense of numerical identity. (Identical twins are geneti-
cally identical in the weak sense; they have exactly sim-
ilar genes. The evening star and the morning star are
identical in the strong sense; they are one and the same
planet.)
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This strong identity is not confined to particles of the
same type. The properties by which particles can be
distinguished are either relational (like positions) or dy-
namic (characteristic of their interactions, like charges) or
comparative (like mass ratios—the mass of a single parti-
cle has no physical significance). Hence if we consider the
fundamental particles of matter in themselves, out of re-
lation to each other, we must not consider them many. In
themselves they lack distinguishing characteristics. The
nonexistence of separate matter tokens therefore implies
that in themselves they are one and the same thing.
We must accept that being one thing, or many things,
or identical things, or different things does not, in real-
ity, have the absolute meaning that it has for the mind.
These are relative notions. Two particles can be one
thing in one sense, two identical things in another sense,
and two different things in yet another sense. Consid-
ered in themselves, all fundamental particles are one and
the same thing X . Because of the spatial relations that
exist between X and X , they are also many identical
things. (A multiplicity of relations implies at least the
appearance—Shankara might say the illusion—of a mul-
tiplicity of relata.) And to the extent that they possess
distinguishing properties, they are also different things.
Then what is X? X is what every existing fundamen-
tal particle intrinsically is. But, as I have just pointed
out, physics knows nothing of intrinsic properties; the
scientifically knowable properties of particles are extrin-
sic [30] (relational, dynamic, or comparative). All we can
say of an existing fundamental particle in itself is that it
exists. Hence X is existence pure and simple. And since
existence (sat) is one of the three principal characteri-
zations (sat-chit-ananda) of Brahman, the identification
X=Brahman seems justified.
For integral Vedantists the world is a manifestation of
Brahman. QM tells us something about how this man-
ifestation is effected. By entering into spatial relations
with itself, formless Brahman acquires the aspect of a
multiplicity of formless particles. Along with the parti-
cles, space and forms come into existence, for space is
the totality of existing spatial relations (between Brah-
man and Brahman), and forms are particular sets of such
relations.
Space contains—in the proper, set-theoretic sense of
“containment”—the forms of all things that have forms.
It does not contain material objects over and above their
forms; a fortiori it does not contain the formless “con-
stituents” of matter. Physical space exists between the
fundamental particles. And since what exists at either
end of each spatial relation is Brahman, spatial relations
are internal to Brahman. QM tells us that the physi-
cal world is both constituted by Brahman and suspended
within Brahman, if by “Brahman” we mean a pure exis-
tence which enters into spatial relations with itself. Note
that the second aspect of Brahman, consciousness (chit),
does not figure in the intersection of Vedanta and QM.
The world is differentiated both spacewise (spatial re-
lations warrant distinctions between “here” and “there”)
and timewise (temporal relations warrant distinctions be-
tween “now” and “then”). The temporal differentiation
is effected by change, for time and change are coimpli-
cates: A timeless world cannot change, and a changeless
world is temporally undifferentiated and therefore time-
less. In my opinion, the quintessential message of QM is
that there are limits to the world’s spatial and temporal
differentiation. The world is only finitely differentiated.
This too conflicts with the CCP, for the latter implies
that the world is infinitely differentiated spacewise (as
we have seen) and therefore also timewise.[31] QM tells
us how and to what extent the world is spatially and tem-
porally differentiated. As long as our thinking adheres to
the CCP and we assume, accordingly, that the world is
infinitely differentiated to begin with, we cannot but fail
to get its message.
In an infinitely differentiated world, spatial relations
are determinate quantities; they possess definite values.
In a finitely differentiated world, spatial relations are in-
determinate quantities; they possess fuzzy values. The
proper conceptualization of indefiniteness requires the
use of statistical concepts, and this is why quantum me-
chanics is formally a statistical theory, concerned with
probabilities. But why is the world only finitely differen-
tiated? Why do spatial relations have fuzzy values? The
answer is that, for all we know, this is the only consistent
way to “fluff out matter”—to create material objects of
finite size using a finite number of formless particles, or
to manifest finite forms using a finite number of spatial
relations. If you are Brahman, and you want to create
spatially extended objects by entering into spatial rela-
tions with yourself, you have no choice but to let these
relations have fuzzy values.
A possible way of giving quantum mechanics in a nut-
shell is to say that there are limits to the objective reality
of mental distinctions. Recall Sri Aurobindo’s character-
ization of mind. Mind is the agent of division, of differen-
tiation. When it is employed by supermind, the original
creative principle, mind is used judiciously. The mind’s
tendency to divide ad infinitum is checked. But when
mind is separated in its self-awareness from its supra-
mental parent and left to run wild, as it is in us, it not
only divides ad infinitum but also fails to recognize itself
as the instrument of the division. It takes the resulting
multiplicity for the original truth or fact. That is why
mental consciousness is inherently reductionistic, atom-
istic, and therefore materialistic.
According to quantum mechanics, the original truth
or fact is unity, rather than multiplicity. Multiplicity is
contingent and emergent. Quantum physics thus is the
opposite of materialistic. There are, recall, no separate
matter tokens. And since “matter” essentially connotes
the existence of such tokens, there is no matter. There
is a substance—exactly one—and this is Brahman. QM
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describes a world that is created top-down, by a process
of differentiation, rather than bottom-up, by a process of
aggregation. In doing so it reveals that the creative prin-
ciple to which the world owes its existence is supramen-
tal rather than mental, for supermind, characteristically,
proceeds from the One to the Many by differentiation or
particularization, while mind proceeds from the Many to
at best a semblance of unity by aggregation.
Now that we know what QM is trying to tell us about
matter, we can touch on the question of how conscious-
ness relates to matter. QM has nothing to say on this
subject, so we turn to (Sri Aurobindo’s integral) Vedanta.
Brahman is at once pure existence (sat) and pure con-
sciousness (chit). We may characterize it either as an in-
trinsically indeterminate existence with the power to de-
termine itself or as an intrinsically contentless conscious-
ness with the power to give itself content. There is a
supreme way of being, or of being conscious, to which
these two characterizations are equally adequate. Up
there there isn’t any difference between Brahman qua
existence and Brahman qua consciousness. The same
is true at the other end of the great “Chain of Being”,
except that here existence is formless and consciousness
lacks content. Each particle is Brahman, and therefore
each particle is, indistinguishably, a pure existence and
a pure consciousness. The question no longer is how
anything material can be conscious. Instead we must
ask how consciousness acquires content, or how undiffer-
entiated consciousness=being differentiates into content-
filled consciousness and form-determined being. In this
way, as serveral panpsychists [32, 33, 34, 35, 36] have
argued, the hard problem of consciousness [15] becomes
solvable.
The bottom line: As long as you attempt to strait-
jacket QM into materialistic modes of thinking (which is
what the woolly masters do as persistently as the next
physicist), and it makes no sense. Place it into a Vedan-
tic framework of thought, and it makes perfect sense. Let
it speak for itself, and it takes you a long way toward a
Vedantic conception of the world.
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